To Westerners, his hooded eyes and severe
demeanor, his unkempt gray beard and his black turban and robes conveyed
an avenger's wrath. The image is the man.
      Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, the dour
cleric who led an Islamic revolution in Iran, perceived himself above
all as an avenger of the humiliations that the West had for more
than a century inflicted on the Muslims of the Middle East.
      He was among many Muslim autocrats in
this century to embrace a mission designed as a corrective to the
West. Kemal Ataturk, the most daring of them, introduced Turkey,
after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, to Western-style
secularism in order to toughen his society against Europe's imperial
designs. In the 1950s, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, more intemperately,
initiated a fierce campaign of Arab nationalism aimed at eradicating
the vestiges of Western colonialism from the Arab world.
      Khomeini took a different course. All
three, at their apogee, were rulers of once great empires that had
fallen into political and social disarray. But Ataturk and Nasser
were committed to resurrection by beating the West at its own game
of building strong secular states. Khomeini's strategy was to reject
Western ways, keeping Iran close to its Islamic roots.
      Some ask, focusing on this strategy,
whether Khomeini was riding a popular wave in global affairs. In
the late 20th century, Muslims were not alone in organizing to restore
religious belief to government. Christians in America, Jews in Israel,
even Hindus in India were promoting the same end. As a revolutionary,
Khomeini sought to bring down not just the Shah's Western-oriented
state but also the secular Weltanschauung that stood behind it. Did
Khomeini's triumph augur an intellectual shift of global magnitude?
      While historians ponder this question,
it is enough to say that Khomeini presided brilliantly over the overthrow
of a wounded regime. He was merciless and cunning. His well-advertised
piety complemented a prodigious skill in grasping and shaping Iran's
complex politics. Most important, he knew how to exploit the feelings
of nationalist resentment that characterized his time.
      Ruhollah Khomeini--his given name means "inspired
of God"--was born to a family of Shi'ite scholars in a village near
Tehran in 1902. Shi'ism, a minority sect in Islam, is Iran's official
religion. Like his father, he moved from theological studies to a
career as an Islamic jurist. Throughout his life, he was acclaimed
for the depth of his religious learning.
      As a young seminary teacher, Khomeini
was no activist. From the 1920s to the 1940s, he watched passively
as Reza Shah, a monarch who took Ataturk as his model, promoted secularization
and narrowed clerical powers. Similarly, Khomeini was detached from
the great crisis of the 1950s in which Reza Shah's son Mohammed Reza
Pahlavi turned to America to save himself from demonstrators on Tehran's
streets who were clamoring for democratic reform.
      Khomeini was then the disciple of Iran's
pre-eminent cleric, Ayatullah Mohammed Boroujerdi, a defender of
the tradition of clerical deference to established power. But in
1962, after Boroujerdi's death, Khomeini revealed his long-hidden
wrath and acquired a substantial following as a sharp-tongued antagonist
of the Shah's.
      Khomeini was clearly at home with populist
demagogy. He taunted the Shah for his ties with Israel, warning that
the Jews were seeking to take over Iran. He denounced as non-Islamic
a bill to grant the vote to women. He called a proposal to permit
American servicemen based in Iran to be tried in U.S. military courts "a
document for Iran's enslavement." In 1964 he was banished by the
Shah to Turkey, then was permitted to relocate in the Shi'ite holy
city of An Najaf in Iraq. But the Shah erred in thinking Khomeini
would be forgotten. In An Najaf, he received Iranians of every station
and sent home tape cassettes of sermons to be peddled in the bazaars.
In exile, Khomeini became the acknowledged leader of the opposition.
      In An Najaf, Khomeini also shaped a revolutionary
doctrine. Shi'ism, historically, demanded of the state only that
it keep itself open to clerical guidance. Though relations between
clergy and state were often tense, they were rarely belligerent.
Khomeini, condemning the Shah's servility to America and his secularism,
deviated from accepted tenets to attack the regime's legitimacy,
calling for a clerical state, which had no Islamic precedent.
      In late 1978 huge street demonstrations
calling for the Shah's abdication ignited the government's implosion.
Students, the middle class, bazaar merchants, workers, the army--the
pillars of society--successively abandoned the regime. The Shah had
nowhere to turn for help but to Washington. Yet the more he did,
the more isolated he became. In January 1979 he fled to the West.
Two weeks later, Khomeini returned home in triumph.
      Popularly acclaimed as leader, Khomeini
set out to confirm his authority and lay the groundwork for a clerical
state. With revolutionary fervor riding high, armed vigilante bands
and kangaroo courts made bloody work of the Shah's last partisans.
Khomeini canceled an experiment with parliamentarism and ordered
an Assembly of Experts to draft an Islamic constitution. Overriding
reservations from the Shi'ite hierarchy, the delegates designed a
state that Khomeini would command and the clergy would run, enforcing
religious law. In November, Khomeini partisans, with anti-American
passions still rising, seized the U.S. embassy and held 52 hostages.
      Over the remaining decade of his life,
Khomeini consolidated his rule. Proving himself as ruthless as the
Shah had been, he had thousands killed while stamping out a rebellion
of the secular left. He stacked the state bureaucracies with faithful
clerics and drenched the schools and the media with his personal
doctrines. After purging the military and security services, he rebuilt
them to ensure their loyalty to the clerical state.
      Khomeini also launched a campaign to "export"--the
term was his--the revolution to surrounding Muslim countries. His
provocations of Iraq in 1980 helped start a war that lasted eight
years, at the cost of a million lives, and that ended only after
America intervened to sink several Iranian warships in the Persian
Gulf. Iranians asked whether God had revoked his blessing of the
revolution. Khomeini described the defeat as "more deadly than taking
poison."
      To rally his demoralized supporters,
he issued the celebrated fatwa condemning
to death the writer Salman Rushdie for heresies contained in his
novel The Satanic Verses. Though born a Muslim, Rushdie was
not a Shi'ite; a British subject, he had no ties to Iran. The fatwa ,
an audacious claim of authority over Muslims everywhere, was the
revolution's ultimate export. Khomeini died a few months later. But
the fatwa lived
on, a source of bitterness--as he intended it to be--between Iran
and the West.
      Beside the fatwa ,
what is Khomeini's legacy? The revolution, no longer at risk, still
revels in having repeatedly, with impunity, defied the American Satan.
The Islamic state was proof to the faithful--as the Soviet Union
was to generations of communists--that the Western system need not
be a universal model.
      Yet Khomeini rejected a parallel between
his doctrines and the fundamentalism propounded by other Muslim dissidents.
He never described himself as fundamentalist. He often said that
Islam is not for 14 centuries ago in Arabia but for all time.
      Since Khomeini's death, the popular appeal
of an Islamic state--and of fundamentalism--has surely dimmed. Thinkers
still debate and warriors kill, but no country seems prepared to
emulate Iran. Perhaps revolutions happen only under majestic leaders,
and no one like Khomeini has since appeared.